Southern Anthropologist
Volume 30
Number 1 Spring 2004

Article 2

4-1-2004

Of Heroines and Victims: Women and Economic Development in
Medellín, Colombia
Donna F. Murdock
University of the South

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/southern_anthropologist

Recommended Citation
Murdock, Donna F. (2004) "Of Heroines and Victims: Women and Economic Development in Medellín,
Colombia," Southern Anthropologist: Vol. 30: No. 1, Article 2.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/southern_anthropologist/vol30/iss1/2

This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Southern Anthropological Society at
eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Southern Anthropologist by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Of Heroines and Victims:
Women and Economic Development
in Medellin, Colombia
Donna E Murdock
University of the South

As in many parts of the world, women in Colombia participate in economic devel
opment projects ostensibly designed to improve their own lives and those of their
communities. Indeed, women’s development has become a huge world-wide in
dustry, so much so that most developing countries today must demonstrate attention
to women’s situations in order to receive international development aid.1 In fact,
over the past four decades women’s development has been pursued by many na
tions as part of an argument about “efficiency”; it is more efficient to harness
women’s energy for development than to allow them to “waste” it languishing in
the home (Moser 1989).2 As development strategies have shifted toward neoliberal
approaches that involve cutting state budgets for health care, education, and other
social programs, there is an even greater expectation that women will fill the gaps
left by state withdrawal (Boesten 2003; Lind 2003). In this climate, women have
become the virtual heroines of development, committing time, energy, and re
sources to help their communities and their nations.
Under circumstances where women are increasingly relied upon for develop
ment work, some important questions need answering. Are women victimized or
empowered by their participation in development? This is not a new question, and
obviously the answers are complicated. Clearly, women’s often heroic participa
tion in national development schemes can be both empowering and victimizing.
However, through the examination of three case studies from Colombia, I will
argue that the shift toward neoliberal development policies creates conditions un
der which women’s participation in development is both more necessary for survival,
and more difficult to maintain. These policies, slashing state budgets for social
services, increasing unemployment rates, and exacerbating social conflict, make
demands of women that ate perhaps both unreasonable and unfair.
Asking After Women’s Development

The question of whether development is good for women is not a new one. Esther
Boserup first introduced it in her 1970 ground breaking study “Woman’s Role in
Economic Development.” A number of studies at the time questioned the impact
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of development around the world, but Boserup specifically asked whether women
were doing better or worse after a decade of development. She showed that in fact,
women’s economic status in many developing nations had decreased: many women
who had previously had some economic independence (through participation in
the market for instance), had been shunted into subsistence agriculture while their
men entered the cash economy through small-scale production or wage labor.3
Importantly, Boserup believed that women’s marginalization from develop
ment was not only devastating to women, but was also disastrous for developing
countries. Integrating women into development would ultimately help everyone,
she thought, because women who were doing better would help their families, and
in turn their nations, to do better as well.4 In this view, women could be the
heroines of development, if only they could be fully integrated into its processes.
Almost immediately, Boserup’s view was contested. Other feminist theorists
such as Lourdes Benería and Gita Sen (1981) argued that just as developing na
tions were deeply integrated into world markets in ways that perpetually
subordinated them, so were women? Women had not been marginalized from
development, but instead had been integrated into development processes in very
particular ways. The growth of formal capitalist economies in developing nations
depended upon women’s cheap or unpaid labor (whether in the home, or as parttime, seasonal, or otherwise underpaid workers). Similarly, the growth of community
development programs depended upon women’s volunteer labor (Lind 2003). Some
argue that this has constituted the “super-exploitation” of women: adding organi
zational work and development planning to their already overloaded “double shift”
of family responsibilities and work in the formal and informal economies (Benería
and Sen 1981; Sen and Grown 1987; Young 1993; Marchand and Parpart 1995;
Ward and Pyle 1995). In this view, women are the victims of development—“inte
grated” in ways that fail to recognize the contributions of their labor but that
nevertheless make that labor indispensable to the process.
The point of agreement in both sets of claims is that women’s heroism in
development can be either empowering or victimizing, depending upon the con
ditions of their participation.6 Actually, if one views these terms as opposite points
on a continuum, then participation in development can be both empowering and
victimizing at the same time, but the balance between the two can be affected by
surrounding circumstances.
If the circumstances in which development is undertaken are what make the
difference between abject victimization and some balance between “good” and
“bad,” then we really need to understand the exact conditions under which women
labor (Lind 2003; Alvarez 1996). In particular, as neoliberal development policies
are implemented throughout the developing world, we need to understand how
these policies affect women.
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The Neoliberal Development Context and Women

In Latin America specifically, earlier import substitution development policies that
created jobs and protected local industries have been gradually eroded. In their
place are neoliberal policies that revive liberal economic faith in the viability and
justice of free markets, and the sole responsibility of individuals to survive by sell
ing their goods on the market (whether these “goods” are labor or commodities).
Such policies emphasize free trade on the international market, decreased govern
ment intervention in the economy, and correspondingly downsized government
budgets (Rosen and McFedyen 1995). Development programs under this rubric
increasingly focus on the production of goods for sale as a panacea for growing
unemployment, under-employment, and associated poverty. Placing the locus of
responsibility for economic development on the individual, these policies frequently
fail to consider how individual capacity is shaped by larger social contexts within
which people live. Indeed, in many parts of the world, neoliberal economic poli
cies themselves create circumstances that make successful initiatives more difficult
than ever. In Latin America, scholars have demonstrated that neoliberal policies
have had drastically negative effects on the social fabric as the gap between rich
and poor grows wider, and crime rates and unemployment soar across the region
(Portes and Hoffman 2003; Phillips 1998; Kuczynski 1988; George 1997).
Women are particularly burdened. While women’s labor has long been crucial
to the development process, neoliberal development programs make that labor
especially difficult as women are increasingly expected to provide care and services
that the state had earlier supplied (Bakker 1994; Beneria and Feldman 1992; Vavrus
and Richey 2003; Lind 2002). For instance, under neoliberal emphases on
privatization of the economy, women have been laid off from government em
ployment and expected to rely on male partners’ wages, or targeted for small business
loans that allow them to pursue activities such as selling sodas and ice cream out of
their front parlors. In Colombia, as unemployment rates soar, women are expected
to fill income gaps, or even support entire families, on the monies they might
receive through such small business enterprises. This makes often unjustified as
sumptions about family structure, as over one-third of Colombian families are
headed by single females (Bonilla 1985). Such a policy also makes unrealistic de
mands on women forced to rely upon the precarious informal economy, defined
by the lack of guarantees such as a minimum wage, insurance and health benefits,
and healthy working conditions (Babb 2001; Isserles 2003).
The Colombian case is especially interesting because it has only recently un
dergone some of the structural adjustment programs that have ravaged much of
Latin America over the past twenty-five years. Moreover, Colombia suffers the
effects of a very complicated armed conflict. As a result of both circumstances,
poverty and violence are endemic issues that women participating in development
must face. Under these conditions, women find that their participation in devel
opment can be “good” for them in that it often strengthens their sense of capability
and personal worth; at the same time, it is “bad” for them in that, as development
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participants, they are often exposed to greater violence and even greater poverty
than they might otherwise be. Development is a paradoxical practice for women
in Colombia, one that makes them both heroines and victims.
The Colombian Cases
Political Economy and Womens Development

The particular historical moment in which I began this research was an especially
difficult one for Colombians. The country’s development strategy of import sub
stitution and the protection of local industry had begun to erode earlier, but it had
retained a fairly stable economy even through the debt crisis of the 1980s that so
affected other Latin American countries (Sánchez 2001). However, in September
1998, President Andres Pastrana announced an “economic and social emergency”7
and instituted austerity measures that cut state budgets for health care, education,
and development programs, as well as subsidized food, utilities, and transporta
tion for the poor. By 1999, the country was in “full recession” and the “official
unemployment rate reached 20%” (Reina 2001: 75).8
In addition to the economic troubles, social problems also worsened. Colom
bia had enjoyed a period of relative respite from violence following the signing of
the new 1991 Constitution and the death of the infamous drug-trafficker Pablo
Escobar. However, when President Pastrana went forward with plans to negotiate
for peace with the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia [“Las FARC”] in
1998, Colombia’s conflict reasserted itself. In order to strengthen their position, or
in some cases, to demand a place at the bargaining table, both the FARC and other
armed actors escalated the violence (Bergquist, Penaranda and Sánchez 2001).
The working poor were especially hard hit by these events. On the slopes
located at the northern end of Medellín, one-half of the city’s 2 million inhabit
ants lived in what were collectively known as “the communities” [“las comunas”]
(Naranjo-Giraldo 1992).9 Stereotyped as poverty-stricken and violent, these
areas have been plagued by drug-traffickers, guerrilla groups, paramilitaries, and
self-appointed vigilantes, all of whom have contributed to the creation of
numerous gangs, over 200 of which operate in the northeastern communities alone
(Salazar 1990, 1993). During 1999, unemployment in these areas reached 60%
and by 2000 when I left the field, 42% of the population had decreased its food
consumption in order to survive (Departamento Administrative 2001). Gangs
helped to assuage the crisis through illegal money-making schemes including the
drug trade, black market in alcohol, cigarettes, clothes, etc., and through extorting
protection money from busdrivers, store-owners, and other entrepreneurs.
Refugee families fleeing the rural violence exacerbated already-existing pres
sures on poor communities.10 In particular, they not only competed with long-term
residents for jobs and state funds for development, but also tapped into utility
lines feeding nearby homes thus driving up costs for all. In general, these parts of
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the city were not well-equipped to receive the influx of refugee families, and ten
sions abounded.
Women seeking help with these problems from government agencies were
sorely disappointed when funding for women’s development was also drastically
cut. This was especially devastating given the earlier commitments various govern
ments had made. In 1992, Governor Juan Gómez Martinez had founded the
Women’s Department [“La Consejería Para la Mujer”] of the state of Antioquia in
exchange for electoral support from the region’s women’s organizations. This Gov
ernor envisioned the Women’s Department as part of the overall “modernization”
project of the state. Under the leadership of this agency, the state launched a series
of wide-ranging projects that encouraged women’s participation in the region’s
economic development.11
However, by the time I began fieldwork in 1998, changes were afoot. The new
Governor of Antioquia, Alberto Builes Ortega, facing budget restrictions, was less
committed to the agency. As a result, the Women’s Department faced a budget
crisis and staff were reduced, programs disappeared, and the once-influential
Women’s Department appeared to be limping along, hoping to hold out long
enough to survive into the next administration.12
Similarly, the City Agency for Women [“La Casa de la Mujer,” literally the
“Women’s House”] was suffering under overall budget restrictions and decreased
spending on women’s development. The City Agency had opened in 1994 with
the explicit goal of decreasing working-class women’s reliance upon state agencies
to resolve their economic and social problems. By promoting women’s self-esteem
and involving them in small-business enterprises (often involving the sale of cooked
foods), the agency hoped to foster women’s participation in development, and
their ability to improve the quality of their homes and communities. In 1998, its
staff was continuing to work in these areas, but with less money to help a popula
tion facing cutbacks in government services, growing unemployment, and
worsening violence.
Methods

It was in this context that I began my research. From September to December
1998, I hired a research assistant whom I had first met in 1996 when he was still
employed by the Women’s Department. As one of the founding employees of this
agency, he had numerous contacts with government officials as well as with women’s
organizations all over the city and state. He introduced me to a number of women
who had been involved in development programs organized by both of the central
agencies I have discussed, and was invaluable to my research in these arenas.
During this time period, I interviewed officials in both the state and city
women’s development agencies, attended workshops, and visited women’s groups
that were involved in these government programs. I also interviewed leaders of 11
different women’s groups, and visited specific development projects in both urban
and rural areas around the state. Of these various interviews and projects, I have
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selected three that were most representative of the kinds of problems faced by
those interested in women’s development.
The Recycling Project

About 60 miles southeast of Medellín, in an economically depressed area, the
Women’s Department of Antioquia helped a women’s group start a successful re
cycling program. My assistant took me to observe the project, and as we drove
through the twisty mountain roads, he explained the economic situation for the
surrounding region. It had been planted in coffee, but the debt crisis of the 1980s
had resulted in a transformation: small coffee farmers sold their land and moved to
the city, and wealthier people bought up the land to use for cattle grazing and
country homes [“fincas”] for weekends and holidays. Although the town was nestled
in a small, very picturesque valley, what few tourists it attracted were drawn to the
countryside and rarely ventured into town. As a result, the 13,000 people in the
town lived primarily from the declining coffee industry and were frequently un
employed. In an effort to generate income in this difficult economic climate, a
small women’s group picked up recyclable materials from participating households,
then cleaned, repackaged, and resold the stuff to businesses in Medellín.
During our day-long trip, I was able to interview the group’s leader, attend a
group meeting, and also visit the processing center where materials were prepared
for shipping. I learned the history of their organization, and the kinds of work
they were presently doing. I was impressed by the pride the group showed in their
accomplishments, and at the same time distressed by the wide variety of obstacles
they faced.
The group had originally formed in 1994 with 40 members interested in pur
suing some kind of income-generating development project. During their first
two years, the Women’s Department was one of many agencies engaged in social
development projects for women, and provided the group with training in womens
economic and political rights in relation to their families and the state. They were
also put into contact with the smaller agencies that eventually funded them.
They were successful in making these contacts in part because their president
had a particularly conducive social situation. Her husband, a college graduate with
a degree in Sociology, was very interested in supporting women’s development
work, and encouraged his wife’s participation. Moreover, they owned a wood
working shop and had no children, so in addition to her husband’s emotional
support, the president also had the free time and financial means to travel across
the state meeting development agents, attending workshops, and drumming up
support for the group.
In 1996, the group decided to form a recycling business and received funding
from two different state-sponsored sources. This funding enabled them to access
training and equipment for the collection of recyclable materials, and to start edu
cating the public about their project.
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Education was a big task, as the town had never participated in a recycling
program before, and townspeople did not understand how it was supposed to
work. For instance, it took the women 2 years to teach townspeople to sort their
own trash. They accomplished this in part through flyers, but also through the
local radio station which allowed them to broadcast in 10-minute slots 3 times a
week.
There was also a great deal of prejudice against trash collectors in the town.
Many members of the original group quit over the recycling project because they
felt it was “denigrating work” [“un trabajo denigrante”]. In Colombia, as else
where in the world, the very poor regularly visit garbage dumps and trash heaps in
search of food, clothing, items to sell, etc. It is quite common to hear these people
referred to in unambiguously negative terms such as “disposable ones”
[“desechables”] or “garbage-pickers” [“basuriega”]. In 1998, workers said that they
were recognized as “recyclers” [“recicladoras”]; however, many people in the com
munity still failed to understand the value of the recycling program. They continued
to believe that they were doing women a favor by “allowing” them to pick up their
trash and sell it. In other words, residents who recycled their trash believed that
they were engaged in charity work rather than being provided with a service!
It was true that recycling was performed by very poor people. By the time I
met the recycling group in 1998, their numbers had dwindled to 18, and only 8 of
the very poorest members of the group actually did the recycling labor. Colombia’s
public utilities companies assign every household to a particular economic stra
tum, ranging from “stratum 1” which is the lowest, to “stratum 6” which is the
highest.1 These assignations are quite familiar to almost everyone, and people
readily speak about economic status in these terms. Most development projects
target only members of strata 1 and 2, and in this case, funding specified that only
women in these economic strata could benefit from the project. The president and
other members, occupying strata 3 and 4, were not eligible to receive a salary from
the project proceeds.
The project had been successful from a financial standpoint; in 1998 the women
were earning enough money from the sale of recycled materials to pay their own
salaries and were no longer dependent upon financing agencies. In part, this was
the result of savvy investing. When they still had financing, they had agreed to
keep their wages low so that surplus capital could be invested, and they then paid
wages out of that investment. At the suggestion of the president and her husband,
the laboring women had agreed to continue to receive very low wages in the hopes
of building up more capital for future investment.
They were also successful in that the project had grown more respectable and
townspeople seemed to better understand the process. Residents were finally sort
ing their own trash so that organic (or solid kitchen) waste went into 5 gallon
black buckets, while bottles, plastics, paper, and cardboard went into separate plastic
bags. On collection days, every other Monday or Tuesday, the 8 women walked
down the streets with wheelbarrows yelling “recycling, recycling” [“reciclaje,
reciclaje”] and people brought their trash out to them.
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The rest of the work-week, the women spent their time sorting and processing
the trash. The processing center, on the outskirts of town up a small dirt road, was
an open-walled brick shed with a large storage room and several sinks along one
end. There, women cut open, washed, and sorted plastic drink bags by color. Plas
tic bottles were washed and sorted by color and type of plastic. Paper and cardboard
was sorted and then repackaged by type. Glass bottles were sorted by color, and
then smashed up against a wall so that the pieces fell into a bricked-in space. Once
the trash was sorted, cleaned, and re-bagged, it was taken by truck to Medellin
where businesses bought recycled materials.
While the project was successful, women continued to face several obstacles
that made their participation more difficult. First, the 8 women worked five days
a week for 8 hours a day, earning about US$64 every month. This was considerably
less than the Colombian state’s mandated minimum wage of US$119 per month.
Worse, the actual cost of living—food, health services, housing, transport, educa
tion, and entertainment—for a family of five had been calculated at more than
twice that amount—roughly US $286.14 This meant that more than 2 minimum
salaries were required for sustaining the average household, while these women
earned less than one.
I asked the president why women were willing to work for so little compensa
tion. She shrugged her shoulders and answered, “their standard of living
[“condiciones de la vida”] has not improved substantially. Perhaps they are assured
of sugar and rice that they did not have before, but their conditions have not
improved!” Then I asked, “So why do they do it? What did they live on before?”
She answered with a laugh, “from the weather! [“del clima”].” Then more seri
ously, she admitted, “This is a question that I have asked myself, because they have
now worked under these conditions for two years, so this must represent an im
provement. ... It must be that before, they were actually hungry.” I then suggested
that perhaps the women had partners who helped support their households. She
said, “Yes, some of them have partners who work and earn a little money, but there
are several who do not have any other income.” After I had turned off the tape
recorder, she added that perhaps they continued in the project because their only
alternative was prostitution.
Poor working conditions were also a problem for the group. The collection
work was especially difficult as women walked several miles in the hot sun (or
pouring rain) with many pounds of trash piled high into wheelbarrows. Once they
arrived at the processing center, its structure was not designed to protect them
from the elements. They worked in the open patio area even in the heavy rains that
fell in the afternoons and had nowhere to sit and relax except on plastic bags full of
recycled materials. Breaking glass bottles by hand was obviously hazardous busi
ness and one admitted that she cut her hands frequently as glass bounced back off
the walls. They had recently bought heavy uniforms in the hope of protecting
themselves from the dirt and cutting edges of the materials they worked with, but
some refused to wear them because they were too heavy or too hot. In addition,
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the project was too poor to provide health care or retirement benefits—so getting
sick or injured on the job was a serious problem.
Another problem was that of transport. The town loaned them a truck a couple
of times a month to get materials to Medellín where they could be sold, but there
were often days when the truck was not running, or when the roads were washed
out.1 When I arrived, it had been 5 days since they had been able to use the truck,
and their processing shed was overflowing. If the truck were not repaired soon,
they would have to stop collecting materials until they could get some things to
the city. This was a serious problem as it disrupted the flow of goods and capital,
and could potentially endanger women’s paychecks for weeks at a time. Further, it
could damage the fragile reputation they had worked so hard to establish with the
town’s residents. Undoubtedly, they needed a more reliable source of transport.
As I left the town that night, I reflected on both the successes they had won,
and the continued challenges these women faced. These women were clearly “hero
ines” in the sense that they provided a genuine service that under different
circumstances would have been provided by the state. Their participation did seem
to deliver on some of the “empowerment” promises; women were clearly proud of
their labor and of the project’s successes. At the same time they were victimized by
the process in that they labored under very difficult circumstances and on top of
that, were still perceived as the recipients of charity despite their ingenuity and
hard work. Like so many development projects for women, this one seemed to be
relying upon women’s back-breaking labor to provide a community-wide service
in exchange for minimal remuneration. The conditions, at least at that moment,
seemed to tip the balance from empowerment toward victimization. .

The Bakery Cooperative
Back in the city, I was anxious to observe one of the City Agency’s more successful
projects, a women’s restaurant and bakery cooperative located in a northwestern
neighborhood. My research assistant and I took the bus up the hill to visit them
one warm, sunny morning. We spent the day talking with the group’s president,
touring their premises, and hearing the history of the group’s development.
The Bakery and Restaurant Cooperative was formed in 1994 originally as a
neighborhood organization with some ties to the local Protestant church. Although
much larger in the beginning, they had gradually dwindled down to the current
21 members. When they first started, most of the women worked as domestic
servants during the day, and at night worked as a group cooking sausages and
tamales, and creating Christmas decorations for sale in their neighborhoods.
At this same time, the City Agency was conducting programs for ex-guerrilla
members [“reinsertados”] in the area. Urban guerrillas [“milicianos”] operated in
many of the city’s poor neighborhoods, and the state from time to time offered
alternative employment and development schemes to these areas in order to con
trol or dampen guerrilla activities. As part of an overall effort to establish a positive
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state presence, these programs often extended beyond the guerrillas themselves to
other members of their communities, including women’s groups.
As part of such a program begun in 1995, this women’s group was contracted
by the City Agency to provide meals the city fed to the homeless. The group
worked “night and day” to provide 500 sandwiches a day for the city. After five
months, the city gave them money to buy equipment and receive training in bak
ery and restaurant management.
In 1998, they were still running strong, and their circumstances attested to
the success of the program. They had a contract with the City Agency to provide
breakfasts for the homeless, and also lunch meals for the city-wide workshops
often held for women involved in other City Agency programs. They rented a
large building with a covered patio for outdoor seating, a counter from which they
sold candies and pastries, a large kitchen area with space for stove-tops and baking
ovens, and several large storage rooms. They prepared the food on-site, and then
transported it via taxi or private car to the workshop sites the City Agency had
chosen for particular days.
The president was very proud of their work, adding, “I am very pleased with
my good fortune.” In fact, she had invested a great deal of time and effort in the
project. It was because of her efforts that the cooperative was able to buy food on
credit from the grocer down the street. She and the grocer had reached an agree
ment that the cooperative would not have to pay him for groceries until they had
received payment from the City Agency. She had also been responsible for the
development of their food menu. Although she consulted with a nutritionist from
the City Agency, she designed her own menus to be “more filling and more tasty.”
She said these were better for the homeless who were unlikely to get other meals,
and designed to keep clients (such as the state) coming back for more.
Like all development success stories, this one too had its problems, most of
which were economic. Of the 21 members of the cooperative, only 7 (including
the president) actually worked in the restaurant preparing food. This was in part
because there was only enough money for an honorarium [“bonificación”] of about
US$20 a month for each worker. Even for these small sums, they often waited
weeks to be paid by the city. As a result, they lost working members who could not
afford to wait long periods for cash. Moreover, there were many months when the
debts for groceries, transport, utilities, etc. were such that all the money went to
pay debts, with nothing left over for the honorariums! This meant that many of
the workers were either women whose husbands’ salaries could support the house
hold, or they worked elsewhere and labored in the restaurant during their “off”
hours. The restaurant was actually open from 5:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Monday
through Saturday, and a few workers, along with the president, were there every
day. In fact, the president worked so many hours that she only saw her two sons on
Sundays when the restaurant was closed; the rest of the time, they stayed with her
mother.
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In addition to wage problems, the group faced a precarious situation in terms
of their building. They had rented it from the nearby Protestant Church without
any problem until 1997, when the church changed pastors. That year, they had
had to work hard to convince the new pastor to allow them to stay in the building.
In an effort to avoid such difficulties in the future, they had unsuccessfully tried to
get a loan to buy the building. They were turned down by several lenders in part
because as a cooperative of women with little property to offer as collateral, they
had trouble qualifying for small-business loans (usually made to individuals). The
president had heard that sometimes the leaders of such cooperatives had put up
their own homes as collateral for the group, but she had thus far been dissuaded
from that strategy by City Agency employees concerned for her long-term welfare.
Their business was also rather severely affected by the reduced subsidies to the
poor initiated by President Pastrana. For instance, the cuts in government subsi
dies for electricity meant that they had to shut down the electric bread ovens, so
the bakery section of the business was closed for the time being. Other daily neces
sities were also more expensive, such as groceries, water and sewerage, and telephone
services, all making it more difficult for the cooperative to make ends meet.
Lastly, without the ability to secure a loan, they were also unable to buy their
own transport. In order to get the cooked food to the workshops, they had been
using a private truck that they rented from a local man who worked for them while
seeking more lucrative employment. He finally found a good job and his truck was
no longer available. They were on the lookout for another driver, but in the mean
time were using taxis that apparently jostled the food so badly that city workers
had complained. The group worried over this because, as part of neoliberal
privatization of government programs, there was growing pressure on government
agencies to use local private restaurants rather than cooperatives to provide food
for city functions. The group did not want to give the City Agency any excuse to
terminate their contract.
Despite their difficulties, the president clearly felt that her participation in
this project had been tremendously empowering; the women had learned how to
run a small business, and were convinced that they were capable. She said she
worked “night and day” because she loved it so, despite the hardships it created for
her family. Her children in particular complained to her, “You are being a fool. Go
back to where you worked before, you were doing better there.” She had worked as
a maid, and earned more money there, but said, “I know that I do not have any
money, but I feel good about what I am doing.” She explained that some people
“do not understand what a cooperative program is. This is not for getting rich, but
rather to offer a contribution, this is a contribution that one makes.” She indicated
a sense of eventual personal gain as well, saying, “One day this cooperative will
succeed and I will be able to take better care of my children.” For the other women,
also working only for honorariums, one might suspect that they too were similarly
motivated.
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As I said goodbye to this group, I began thinking about how to evaluate the
project. I was struck by the fact that the City Agency relied upon these women to
provide cheap cooked meals for the city’s homeless and other populations in need.
In exchange for their long hours of dedication and hard work, women received
minimal compensation, and were also prevented from expanding their operation
by certain government policies ostensibly designed to decrease the dependency of
the poor upon the state. Clearly, neoliberal economic policies created conditions
that hindered, rather than supported, women’s entrepreneurial activities. Man
dated cutbacks in state spending made it difficult for women to maintain daily
operations. Restrictions on lending that favored the individual entrepreneur rather
than cooperative enterprises made it hard for women to access small business loans.
Additionally, with little provocation the City Agency might turn from state-estab
lished cooperatives to private industry to supply their needs. In this case, the state
exploited (and benefitted greatly from) women’s willingness to become the “hero
ines” of development.
Refugee Women’s Organizations

The last set of projects I want to look at are women’s organizations that the City
Agency has helped to establish in refugee neighborhoods. My research assistant
was working in these neighborhoods at the time, helping womens groups to orga
nize so that they could qualify for development funding from the state. He had
good relationships with women in these areas, and as a result, I was able to travel
with him to visit them.
Groups fleeing the rural violence founded these neighborhoods. In some cases,
they had advance warning that guerrilla or paramilitary were going to attack their
town or village and could pile their belongings together onto a truck. These fami
lies arrived with beds, televisions, refrigerators, stoves, and other material goods
that made setting up house a bit easier upon arrival. In other cases, people fled in
the middle of the night and came to the city with only the belongings they could
gather as they ran. When they arrived in Medellin, they had to begin rebuilding
their lives from scratch. At first, they got very little help from the state.
Refugees built their neighborhoods on squatted land located on some of the
most precarious terrain in the city. The evening news was frequently filled with
stories of yet another squatter settlement that had been destroyed by landslide, or
moved by police for fear that such an event would occur. Refugees began to peti
tion the state for the right to build on squatted land as soon as they arrived, but
while awaiting legalization, they built houses, stairways, sidewalks, community
centers, schools, and even roads with the bits of money they were able to save as
construction workers, night watchmen, or domestic servants (Naranjo-Giraldo
1992).
Visiting these neighborhoods involved climbing steep, curving roads up through
the northeastern communities until finally we reached the peak and the road ran
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out. Sprawled on the hillside below the road, we reached the houses by climbing
down vertiginous stairways carved literally out of the side of the mountain. Shacks
[“ranchos”] built of found wood, cardboard, tin, and sometimes brick if the fami
lies were lucky enough, protected families from the elements. Ugly snaking electrical
lines were strung haphazardly between the houses, tapped illegally into the official
grid further down slope.
Gaining legal recognition for their neighborhoods, and thus access to all the
amenities that came with that recognition—sewerage, electricity, water, telephones,
schools, roads, garbage services, etc.—was one of the main goals for neighborhood
women’s organizations. Women whose husbands had the best paying jobs did not
work outside the home, and thus had time for organizing, garnering official sup
port and recognition, and participating in community development. They engaged
in activities that benefitted the entire community, including poorer families and
those women left widowed with children by the war.
In Medellín, it was necessary for women’s groups to have a legal structure in
order to be eligible for government funding. My research assistant worked with
the City Agency to help women get through this process. It involved the election
of a Board of Directors, the construction of By-laws, and participation in a series
of workshops covering a variety of issues. I had the opportunity to attend the
workshop during which women in one neighborhood adopted a formal legal struc
ture. The process was complicated and revealed a serious obstacle to women’s
organizing in this manner.
Unfortunately, although Colombia reports an official 98% literacy rate (UNDP
1999), many people still found it difficult to attend school in the late 1990s.16 In
particular, people living in isolated rural areas were often quite far away from the
nearest schools and had to be boarded during the school year. This could be ex
pensive, and families were especially reluctant to send daughters away to school.
The result was that many of the adult women in refugee women’s organizations
were functionally illiterate. Instructions for preparing By-laws had to be read aloud
to them by development workers, and the details painstakingly explained over and
over again. Even the election of Board members was made difficult: women could
not read a ballot nor write out individual names. Voting was thus conducted by
having everyone close their eyes and raise their hands when development workers
called the names of women for whom they wished to vote.
There was another, more serious obstacle that made this kind of development
participation difficult. There was little state presence in these communities other
than the few development workers who ventured up the slope, and gangs of all
kinds proliferated. Perhaps not surprisingly, armed groups were displeased by
women’s organizing strategies, especially when they tended to increase the state’s
interest in their neighborhoods. Women in many organizations reported being
threatened by gang leaders who told them that they would be killed if they contin
ued their activities. Development workers reported being caught in the middle of
gunfights between rival gangs while trying to conduct empowerment workshops.
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I knew from personal experience that state officials were careful to leave refugee
neighborhoods before nightfall. In short, women and development workers some
times risked their lives in order to galvanize state interest in community
development.
Despite the difficulties, women also clearly felt empowered and were pleased
by their participation in these programs. After the meeting when women elected
their first Board of Directors, the group brought out a surprise feast of Christmas
treats that they had collectively prepared for the City Agency workers who had
been helping them. The president of another group had become a very familiar
face at City Hall demanding that the state recognize and provide services for her
community. She had braved her husbands’ displeasure and risked violence at the
hands of gang members to do so, and was very proud that government workers
were beginning to recognize and respect her.
In this last example, once again women appeared to be both the heroines and
the victims of development. Their efforts were heroic given the circumstances un
der which they struggled to rebuild lives torn apart by violent conflict. Forced to
flee their homes by a war that the state had failed to resolve, and forced to rebuild
those homes under a neoliberal economy that prided individual initiative but would
not easily support it, they were both empowered and victimized by their own
heroism.

Conclusion
In the forty years since Boserup started the wave called “women’s development,”
we have learned that questions about women’s participation in development have
complicated answers. Clearly, development can be “good” for women, and con
versely, women are “good” for development. In fact, women make obviously heroic
efforts to contribute to their communities’ and their nations’ development projects.
In the process, they learn skills, garner supports for their organizational labor, and
gain a profound sense of accomplishment.
At the same time, they often engage in these practices under extremely harsh
circumstances and may be victimized by their very participation. Colombian women
in the three case studies were limited by a neoliberal economy that cut social spend
ing while raising unemployment, and by a violent social conflict that increased
tensions in marginalized neighborhoods and made organizing for change more
difficult.
Under such circumstances, it is important to ask after women’s development
and in particular, it is important to ask about the viability of a neoliberal doctrine
of individual responsibility and “hard work” in world regions afflicted by violence
and rising social inequality. Relying upon individual women’s resources as the major
means by which countries will become “developed” in today’s world seems a seri
ous overestimation of these would-be heroines’ capacities. Ultimately, the
Colombian cases raise questions about both the justice and long-term feasibility of
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putting the burdens of economic development on the backs of the world’s poorest
citizens. We must ask ourselves, how likely is it that “hard work” and “self-reli
ance” alone will accomplish development goals—and equally important—how
fair is it to ask the world’s most vulnerable to put right what powerful states will
not?
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Notes
1. For instance, Ghodsee (2003: 33) reports that the World Bank “requires ‘Gender Im
pact Assessments’ for all of its development projects.”
2. This particular rhetoric suggesting that womens work in the home does not contribute
to national development is ironic given that women’s dedication to home and family is so often
deemed an essential contribution to nation-building (Radcliffe and Westwood 1996).
3. Boserup contended that women had been marginalized from economic development as
a result of Western biases in major development institutions. According to Boserup, Western
gender ideologies based on a public-private dichotomy (the idea that the proper role for women
was in the home, doing domestic labor, while men belonged in the “public” world of politics
and commerce), had informed development practitioners’ views of women’s roles, and had
resulted in the marginalization of women from productive labor.
4. The idea was that women would share their good fortune with others, using money to
feed children and send them to school, etc.
5. This is an argument from the dependency school of development (Frank 1967; Cardoso
and Faletto 1979).
6. For more recent feminist development thought see Elson 1992; Young 1993; Kabeer
1994; and Saunders 2002.
7. All translations from the Spanish are my own, unless otherwise indicated.
8. President Gaviria’s development plan (1991-94) accelerated the economic “apertura”
[opening] begun tentatively in the 1950s; with a more neoliberal economic policy, foreign
investment in Colombia doubled between 1990 and 1994 (Bergquist, Penaranda, and Sánchez
G. 2001: xvi), and international goods entered the country at an unprecedented rate. Reina
(2001: 75) argues that the apertura “devastated broad sectors of Colombian industry and agri
culture thus exposed to the competitive pressures of the world market.”
9. These communities were built upon the northern slopes on each side of the central
valley where the downtown area was constructed. In 1998, the northwestern slope was home to
500,000 people, while the northeastern slope was home to another 500,000. Both sides are
collectively known as the most violent, poverty-stricken areas of the city, but the northeastern
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communities [“la comuna nororiental”] are widely thought to be “worse” in part because the
drug-trafficker Pablo Escobar concentrated his gang-creating activities there in the 1980s.
10. In 1999, Colombia had the third largest internally displaced population in the world,
after Sudan and Angola (Bergquist, et. al 2001, page 230, citing 1999 World Report of Human
Rights Watch, published in 2000).
11. The preceding is taken from two documents supplied to me by Women’s Department
staff—“Democratic Leadership with a Gendered Perspective: Projection of EPAM” and “To
ward Planning with a Gendered Perspective.”
12. In fact, they never received the budget they needed to function at full speed, but were
still in existence when I left the field in December 1999.
13. The price paid for public utilities all over Colombia is graduated according to the value
of property and housing, so that lower income persons pay less for electricity, water, sewerage,
etc. (Berry and Urrutia 1976: 168-169). Stratum are determined by a combination of size of
household, number of persons working, income, housing materials, durable goods, etc.
14. The exchange rate at that time was about 1.7 pesos to the dollar. On December 20,
1998, Antioquia’s regional paper, El Colombiano, published the summary of a report produced
by the National School for Labor Unions, a Medellín-based NGO that worked with the country’s
unionized workers, that calculated the cost of living in 1998 using figures from the Administra
tive Department of National Statistics (“DANE”).
15. The region was geologically unstable, and landslides strong enough to wash out the
roadway were quite common. When this happened, travelers could be stranded for days at a
time waiting for the state to provide road crews who could repair the way.
16. Although education is more widely available today than it was in the 1950s (Puyana
and Orduz 1998), there are still many people living in and around Medellín who were unable
to finish high school. Even in 1995, in the northeastern communities of Medellín, attendance
at high school was estimated at only 78% (Departamento Administrativo 1995).
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